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Abstract
Network coding is widely used in the dissemination schemes of VANETs, because it can improve the network throughput. However,
it will bring the pollution attack into the network, making the decoding procedure error, so vehicles can not recover the original
ﬁle. Therefore, we need adopt a signature scheme to validate a piece without decoding. In the current signing schemes, the linear
subspace signature scheme is to defend the pollution attack. But the length of the signature equal to the piece size required several
packets to be transmitted together. Moreover, even one lost packet or polluted packet may make the whole piece dropped including
the unpolluted packets, causing the limited resources to be wasted. In this paper, we adopt the padding scheme, obtain a packet-size
vector which is orthogonal to linear space spanned by all packets in a generation and sign the vector, reducing the length of the
signature into packet size and more importantly validating coded packets other than coded pieces in a generation. The simulation
shows that our scheme has higher downloading rate, and lower downloading delay.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
VANETs gain much more attention because it can provide safety and optimize road traﬃc. The content dissemina-
tion, related to both commercial and safety service, is the most promising one. In VANETS, the road side unit(RSU)
transfers the content from the passing vehicles, and then disseminates it in the area of the interest. The content
dissemination includes emergency video from the ambulance to the nearby vehicles, a map of current region, etc..
In VANETs, the simplest dissemination way is ﬂooding. In ﬂooding, a message is broadcasted from every node to
all its encounters until the message reaches a predeﬁned maximum hop count (i.e., Time-To-Live or TTL value) or the
destination. But it suﬀers from the problems of large overhead and high redundancy, leading to the so-called broad-
cast storm problem. Network coding has seen its application in information dissemination 1. Network coding can
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achieve broadcast capacity, improve bandwidth eﬃciency and network throughout. However, adversaries in VANETs
can inject polluted messages or forged messages. Such packet pollution attacks can severely lower dissemination per-
formance2 3 4 5. Due to network coding’s unique usage of packets, dissemination techniques using networking coding
in VANETs suﬀer more severely from pollution attacks. For example, one polluted packet can easily invalidate all
downstream packets, wasting all the resources to prepare/transmite/receive/decode those messages.
Another issue is the block size used network coding strategies6 7 8 9 10: block sizes have been chosen as 2 kilobytes
(KB), 4KB, 10KB, or 32KB. And both the signature and the block must be transmitted in several packets. If one
packet is polluted or missing, the whole block becomes useless, which wastes the bandwidth.
In this paper, we present a dissemination protocol in VANETs using the padding skill to defend the pollution attack.
Due to the large pieces and the signature in a generation, we divide the generation into many small sub-generations.
By padding an extra symbol to each piece in the sub-generation, all the sub-generations can have the same signature
in a generation. Both the pieces in the sub-generations and the signature can be transmitted in a single packet. All the
packets belonging to the same generation can be veriﬁed by the corresponding signature.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• To defend the pollution attack, we adopt the homomorphic signature scheme in11. When service time slot starts,
the relay node will broadcast the correspondence signature to in case of that some neighbors may not hold the
signature before transmitting the coded packets of a sub-generation.
• We reduce the signature size from a piece size to a packet size. Therefore, the signature can be transmitted in
one packet and be used to validate every packet in the correspondence generation.
• We improve the network bandwidth eﬃciency by adopting the network coding technique. It removes the wait-
ing time at the beginning of the service time slot compared to CodeOnBasic(7). Moreover, it utilizes every
unpolluted packet to avoid dropping the whole piece even when a single packet is polluted.
• We compare our scheme with CodeOnBasic and CodeOnBasicP(adopting piece-length signatures11 to defend
the pollution attack). Compared with CodeOnBasic, our dissemination can not be completed when no defending
scheme existing. Compared with CodeOnBasicP, our scheme can reduce the download delay by 42.5%
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the related works about pollution attack
and content dissemination in VANETs. In section 3, we introduce the network coding and pollution attack. In section
4 we analyze the problem formulation and proposes solution. The main design of this paper is presented in Section 5.
In section 6 we present the performance and results. Finally, the paper is summarized in Section 7.
2. Related Works
Pollution attacks are fatal to the network coding system if they are out of control. The main methods to solve this
attack are based on algebraic and cryptography.
Algebra schemes can be used to defend the pollution attack.In12, it calculates a vector which is orthogonal to
the linear space spanned by the plain pieces in a generation and sends to the nodes. All coded pieces belong to the
subspace. When receiving a coded piece, the corresponding vector can be used to validate the integrity of the piece.
However, a malicious node can generate a fake piece which does not belong to the subspace to pass the validation.
In13, every node has a vector which is orthogonal to all the plain pieces of the source generation, it can rapidly verify
the coded pieces by validating whether it belongs to the linear subspace or not.
Apart from the algebraic schemes, cryptography has been well-recognized as a eﬀective method to solve pollution
attack, including hash, signature and MAC. Homomorphic hash scheme is ﬁrst proposed in14. The source node ﬁrst
computes the hash of each piece in a generation, and all the hash should be pre-disseminated to all the nodes. In
order to check a received coded piece, nodes should compute the hash of this piece, and compare it with the linearly
combining hash distributed at the beginning. The drawback is that before the plain pieces are transmitted, all the
hashes should be delivered to all nodes. In3, it proposes a new homomorphic signature schemes based on weilpairing
on elliptic curve to defend the pollution attack. The main character of these schemes is that the signature of the linear
combined coded piece is equal to the linear combination of the signatures. But the computational overhead is too high.
In5, it signs a subspace spanned by plain pieces in a generation. When receiving a coded piece, the signatures are
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used to validate if the pieces belong to the speciﬁc linear subspace. It is convenience to validate if the coded pieces are
polluted, while the signature should be transmitted before the corresponding generation. In11 it pads an extra tag to
obtain a vector orthogonal to the pieces in a generation and can obtain the vector before all pieces are ready. However,
both in5 and11 the size of the vector is equal to the piece size. The third type of cryptography to defend pollution
attack is homomorphic MAC15 16, which the MAC of a linear combination of pieces is equal to the linear combination
of MACs correspondence to the pieces.
While the pollution attack is very serious in the network coding schemes, many protocols do not consider how to
extend to defend the pollution attack when adopting network coding. In7, nodes share its ﬁle reception status, and
choose a node who can supply the most innovative pieces to neighbors as a relay, and then calculate a transmission
backoﬀ delay. The protocol using symbol level network coding(SLNC17) while no method can be used to defend the
pollution attack at our best knowledge. The CodeOnBasic is also proposed in7. It adopts randomly linear network
coding(RLNC18), but the pieces in a generation need many packets to send, while even one packet lost or polluted
makes the whole piece unavailable. Both in7 and in8 the authors adopt SLNC which can be more tolerate to collision.
If symbol size is equal to the packet size, the SLNC transforms to RLNC. In9 source nodes send out a ﬁle description
which represent the part received and other nodes keep sending request to neighbors for packets. In10, content are
downloaded from gateways to vehicles and exchanged between vehicles out of the range of gateways.
3. Preliminary
In this part, we ﬁrst introduce the network coding skills18, then present a solution to solve the pollution attack11.
The frequently used notions in this paper are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Symbols
Notation Description
F ﬁle
K the number of pieces a generation consisting of
N the number of generations divided by F
Gi the i-th gerneration
Pi, j a piece of Gi
Gi, j the j-th sub-generation in Gi
Pi, j,k a piece of Gi, j
J the size of a piece in Gi
S the size of a packet
S igi the Signature of Gi
3.1. Network Coding
We assume a large ﬁle F has N generationsG1,G2,...,GN , and each generationGi has K original pieces, pi,0,pi,1,...,pi,K−1.
Each piece in Gi is ﬁxed to size J and the size of a packet is S , therefore each piece in Pi, j has [J/S] packet-
s pi, j,0,pi, j,1,...,pi, j,[J/S ]−1. When disseminating content using network coding, intermediate nodes broadcast coded
pieces, rather than original pieces. At source node, each piece has a unit vector e which is orthogonal to the others
piece’s vector, that is Pi,k = [ei,k pi,k] (ei,k is the unit vector and pi,k is the data set). The intermediate nodes randomly
select coeﬃcients to generate coded piece Pi,k for generation Gi using
Pi,k =
K∑
j=1
ci, jPi, j. (1)
The coeﬃcient ci,k is randomly chosen from the Galois Field(GF). The receivers only keep the innovative pieces which
are linearly independent to other pieces and generate coded packets using Equation (1). We assume the K pieces make
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up a K×K matrix Ki which is made up of the coeﬃcient of each piece, and a K×J matrix Xi for coded data portions.
When receiving K linear independent pieces, the node can recover the original piece using Pi = Ki−1Xi.
3.2. Pollution Attack
Network coding can reduce the redundant packets and improve the bandwidth, it also brings serious pollution attack
which can do great damage to the whole network. For example in Fig 1, if node Z is polluted, it will send a polluted
piece Z1. After Node B receives the the pieces, it perform a liner operation on Z1 and A1 obtaining two polluted coded
pieces B1 and B2 and send to the downstream nodes. Therefore all nodes in the downstream will receive polluted
pieces, which means they get polluted. Nodes can not receive enough correct pieces with the existence of polluted
pieces, so that it is impossible to recover the original content correctly. To make full use of the channel resource,
intermediate nodes should be able to distinguish the polluted pieces from the correct ones. If so, normal node can
only ﬁlter out the polluted piece and broadcast the coded piece without pollution.
Fig. 1: The Inﬂuence of Pollution Attack.
4. Problems Formulation And the Solution
In this section, we ﬁrst present the ﬂaw in the existing signature schemes, then elaborate the improvement. In the
remaining model, we present our algorithms based on utility, making relay decision.
4.1. Problems Formulation
In many schemes, the piece of a generation needs more than one packets to transmit6 7 8 9 10 and the signature of a
generation validates the correctness of each piece belongs to this generation. The size of the signature is equal to the
size of the piece which is too large. What’s more, collision often occurs, and pollution threat exists, some packets in
a piece may be lost or polluted, which causes the whole piece dropped including the unpolluted packets. Therefore,
ﬁnding a way to validate each packets rather than pieces is essential.
4.2. the Solution
In Fig 3(a), a piece size is K + J which needs (K + J)/S packets to transmit. We divide the generation Gi into
J/S sub-generations as shown in Fig 3(b). In sub-generation Gi, j, the piece size is equal to the packet size, thus the
concept of piece and the packet are the same. First, a vector v′ is randomly chosen whose size is K+ J/S +S +1. Then
every piece in Gi, j is padded with an extra tag and the tag is set to make wv = 0. Therefore, the vector is orthogonal
to the linear subspace spanned by Gi, j. Moreover, in Gi there are K/J sub-generations and each sub-generation has K
original pieces, the length of each piece is K + J/S + S + 1. Because of KJ/S < K + J/S + S + 1, it is easy to make
v′ orthogonal to all packets in Gi according to the procedure list before. Signing v′ according to11, thus Gi can has a
signature S igi for generation Gi. The signature S igi can be transmitted in one packet to validate every packet rather
other pieces belonging to the Gi.
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Fig. 2: Padding Packets and Getting Orthog-
onal Vector.
Fig. 3: Dividing Gi into Gi, j. Fig. 4: Road Map.
5. Dissemination Based on Network Coding for Vanets
This paper is a push-based protocol using network coding which nodes/RSUs disseminate a large ﬁle F to all
vehicles in a certain region to defend pollution attack. The source nodes/RSUs hold F and divide it into L generations.
Every generation Gi consists of J/S sub-generations and they have the same signature. Network coding is performed
in the intermediate nodes. In this section we will describe the channel ﬁrst and then elaborate the routing decision.
5.1. Channel
According to DSRC19, the frequency band allocated for VANETs consists of multiple channels. One channel is
used as the control channel to transmit control messages including nodes’ speed, generation reception status,signature
reception status and etc. Other channels are used as the service channels to transmit coded data. We adopt the channels
described in7. There are two channels, a control channel and a service channel. Each channel lasts for 50ms. And all
vehicles include RSUs are synchronized to change between the control channel and the service channel. According
to DSRC, the data rate can be up to 27Mb/s, which means 143KB data can be transmitted during 50ms.
5.2. Routing Decision
Every node/RSU broadcasts the coded content and exchanges their generations and signatures reception status.
Relays are chosen according to the neighbors’ status and coded packets are broadcasted to neighbor nodes. Our
dissemination protocol consists of two steps as below:
• In control time slot, each node broadcasts its generations’ and signatures’ reception information. After receiving
neighbors’ reception status, node s calculates the number of innovative packets it can supply to all its neighbors
for every sub-generation. We take the utility as the maximum number of innovative packets it can supply to
neighbors among sub-generations.Then nodes exchanges its Utility among its neighbors. The utility of node s
is calculated:
Utility = Max(
∑
t∈Nei
(Ri, j,s − Ri, j,t)), t ∈ Nei (2)
• In the service time slot, Nodes with the largest utility among its neighbors will access the service channel and
distribute the coded packet. To defend the threat of pollution attack, the signature should be pre-distributed
before transmitting coded packets of sub-generation Gi, j. At the beginning of the service time, node s can
know whether all the neighbors have the signature of this sub-generation correspondence to its Utility. If all
neighbors have this signature, node s will calculate the number of innovative packets NumO fGi, j it should send.
Otherwise, node s will distribute the signature to neighbors at the beginning of the service time slot, and then
disseminate the coded packets. After the NumO fGi j packets are sent and the service time slot is not over, to
improve the bandwidth eﬃciency, node s will calculate the next biggest Utility and repeat procedure b. When
the service time slot is over, then stop broadcasting.
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When node s accesses the channel, if it randomly create NumO fGi, j coded packets, the limit channel resource
is wasted because some packets may be linearly dependent which does no help to decode and recover the original
generation. The probability of all the NumO fGi, j is linearly independent is
Prob =
K!
(K − NumO fGi, j)!KNumO fGi, j (3)
To make as many as packets useful, nodes should record the packets sent before as a matrix M for each sub-
generation, and M has K packets at most. If rank of M is less than K, then generate a innovative packet, broadcast to
neighbors and add to M£ If rank of M is equal to K, then node s will resend the oldest packet recorded in M.
6. Performance
To evaluate the performance of our dissemination scheme, we use the NS2.34 simulator20. The vehicle movement
patterns are generated by VanetMobiSim21. Vehicles are randomly placed in the road area. To evaluate the eﬀect of
the traﬃc density, we consider both the sparse and the dense urban scenarios. And we also consider the urban scenario
and the highway scenario. The urban scenario is a 4km×4km urban zone as shown in Fig 4. The highway scenario is
a 12km length highway zone. In urban scenario, the sparse setting has 200 vehicles while the dense setting has 400
vehicles. The speed of vehicles in urban scenario ranges from 30km/h to 60 km/h. In highway scenario, the sparse
setting has 50 vehicles while the dense setting has 100 vehicles. The speed of vehicles in highway scenario ranges
from 60km/h to 80 km/h. Each vehicle is equipped with a wireless device. The transmission rate is 11 Mbps and the
transmission range is 250 meters. We assume each vehicle has a small percentage to generate a polluted pieces. And
we evaluated the following metrics:
a) Downloading Progress. It shows the downloading percentage of the ﬁle with time passing by.
b) Average Download Delay. It is the average time cost to complete disseminating contents to all.
c) Dropping Packets. This is the number of packets dropped because of the polluted pieces received.
We compared the scheme this paper presented with other works. First, to demonstrate the eﬀect of pollution attack
when malicious nodes exists, we adopt CodeOnBasic7 watching the performance diﬀerence when malicious nodes ex-
ists and no malicious nodes exists. While to our best knowledge, there is no other dissemination protocols in VANETs
using pollution attack defending methods. Therefore, we introduce piece pollution validation skills to CodeOnBasic,
and name it CodeOnBasicP. Then we compare our packet pollution validation scheme with CodeOnBasicP.
6.1. The Eﬀect of Pollution Attack
From Fig5 and Fig6, it can be seen that with the existence of the malicious vehicles, the 95% packets are polluted
packets in CodeOnBasic. At the beginning, source vehicle/RSU disseminates the content generations to neighbors.
When polluted packets are broadcasted to neighbors, all the neighbors will receive and store the polluted packets,
making the neighbors become pollution sources. Vehicles can not recover the original ﬁle due to the pollution packets
in a generation. While in our scheme, vehicles can obtain the original ﬁle F, because the polluted packets are ﬁltered
out by the pollution attack solution. Therefore, it is necessary to use a pollution attack scheme in VANETs when using
network coding, which should consider the specialty of VANETs.
6.2. Downloading Progress
From Fig 7 and 8, we can see it is very fast to reach to 90% percentage of the ﬁle downloaded both in our
scheme and CodeOnBasicP in urban scenario, and then the downloading progress becomes slower. The comparison
between our scheme over CodeOnBasicP in urban scenario demonstrates our protocol performs faster on completing
the downloading both in sparse and dense settings. From Fig 9 and 10, we can see in the highway scenario, our
scheme also performs better than CodeOnBasicP. When a single packet gets polluted in CodeOnBasicP, the whole
piece which the packet belongs to will be dropped including the others unpolluted packets. Therefore, CodeOnBasicP
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Fig. 5: Pollution in Urban Sparse Scenario. Fig. 6: Pollution in Urban Dense Scenario. Fig. 7: Progress in Sparse Urban Scenario.
Fig. 8: Progress in Sparse Urban Scenario Fig. 9: Progress in Sparse Highway Scenari-
o
Fig. 10: Progress in Dense Highway Sce-
nario
Fig. 11: Delay in Urban Scenarios. Fig. 12: Delay in Highway Scenarios. Fig. 13: The Number of Packets Dropped.
does not make full use of the bandwidth. In contrast, our scheme validates the correctness of every packet, make full
use of every unpolluted packets and only drop the packets which can not pass the validation.
6.3. Downloading Delay
From Fig 11, we can see the downloading delay reduces 26% in sparse settings and 42.5% in dense settings
compared to CodeOnBasicP in urban scenario. In highway scenario, the delay of our scheme can reduce 56.3%
in sparse settings and 77.5% in dense settings compared to CodeOnBasicO from Fig 12. We can see when traﬃc
becomes dense, we can see the downloading delay gets less in our scheme from Fig 11 and Fig 12. Although there
is more vehicles, the collision frequency does not get higher because only one vehicle is chosen as a relay among its
neighbors. Moreover, more neighbors a relay broadcasts content to, faster the contents are spread to other vehicles.
6.4. Dropping Packets
From Fig 13, we can see the number of dropped packets in CodeOnBasicP is about 10 times than that in our
scheme. Because one piece in CodeOnBasicP is 10KB which needs ten packets to transmit. If a single packet in
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a piece gets polluted in CodeOnBasicP, the whole piece will be dropped directly. Moreover, the topology changes
rapidly in VANETs, when a node moves out of the transmission range of the relay, the uncompleted received coded
pieces will be dropped which wastes the bandwidth. In contrast, in our scheme we divide the generation into small
sub-generation. A piece in our scheme only needs a packet to transfer. Even if a packets is polluted, vehicles will
directly drop this packet and stop the pollution spreading to other vehicles.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a push-based dissemination scheme while defending the pollution attack. We study the
impact of the pollution attack and adopt a novel way to reduce the signature of a generation. NS2 simulator is used to
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our dissemination scheme in terms of downloading progress and downloading delay.
Simulation result shows our scheme can improve the download rate and reduce the delay in VANETs.
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